Ideologies revised

Recent discussion of an article in one of my classes has led me to consider ideological application in elections. It is interesting to watch where voters put their trust during each election. Voters delegate the responsibility to run the country to agents, whom they trust will do well and make what they feel would be the best decisions for the nation as a whole. Because of this, we often find voters following after a candidate who shares similar ideology to them. Thus, politicians will do their best to be what the majority of voters would want them to be, have the ideology that most people prefer, or truly believe a certain way that is persuasive to voters that they are most fit for office and will make the best decisions.

An ideology is an internally consistent set of propositions that make both proscriptive and prescriptive demands on human behavior. All ideologies have implications for (a) what is ethically good; (b) how society’s resources should be distributed; and (c) where power appropriately resides (drawn from Hinich and Munger’s article Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice). In the practice of politics, they reward the large-scale organization which leads to centralization.  Ideologies eventually become a political battle of good vs. evil, and people use them to resolve disputes. These ideas cannot imply that something is both right and wrong. A problem voters run into is whether politicians will keep their promises on where they stand on issues and what they will do about the issues they will face.

Ideologies are an excellent way to hold politicians accountable to where they claim they stand on issues. They cannot move their position without discredit and/or discomfot. As voters, we need parties to help us get an idea of how a candidate will act based on what his or her ideology is. We are then left to depend on the candidate's promises or commitment to their ideological positions to guide their judgment. When we look for who want as our future politicians (like with the 2012 presidential election year), voters should not only consider whose ideology is like their own, but whose ideology will succeed at accomplishing overall good for the country. We simply cannot know what lies ahead in the future in terms of what policies will be considered. But, by knowing a candidates ideology, we can gain an understanding of where this candidate stands and have an idea of how they will act.

Governments and Coalitions in Japan

In parliamentary systems of government there are frequently many parties.  After popular elections determine how many seats each party is allocated in the legislature (be it the House of Commons, the Bundestag, or the Diet), the Prime Minister (or Chancellor) is selected by the legislature.  In many countries the party that wins the most seats will not win the majority of seats.  Multiple parties must then form coalitions in order to produce a Prime Minister and a functional government.  There are several types of coalitions.

A majority government occurs when a single party manages to secure the majority of seats in an election.  For many years in Japan, the LDP was able to win more than 50% of the seats in the Diet.  This meant that the LDP did not need to enter into a coalition.  It controlled the majority of the legislature on its own.  (However, it did sometimes form coalitions; for example, in 1986 the LDP and the New Liberal Club formed a coalition.  This was due to the NLC being composed of politicians that had abandoned the LDP previously; most were readmitted after 1986.)

A minority government is uncommon.  It is possible only if a party (or coalition) has less than a majority of the seats in a legislature, but is able to field a Prime Minister anyway.  In 1993, the LDP lost control of the Diet for the first time since 1955.  The LDP won 223 of 511 seats.  The party with the next-largest number of seats won only 70.  However, because almost all other parties formed a coalition, a non-LDP Prime Minister was supported by 243 members of the Diet.  256 seats were required for a majority.  Although the opposition was able to control the selection of Prime Minister, the minority government did not survive long.  Within a year the LDP was back in (tentative) control of the Diet.

A coalition government occurs when no single party is able to secure the majority of seats.  Multiple parties form a coalition that includes a majority of the seats in the legislature in order to produce a Prime Minister and his or her cabinet (which frequently includes members of both parties).  In 1996 the LDP won 239 seats.  Because 251 seats were required to gain a majority, the LDP needed only 12 more seats.  It gained an additional 15 through the Social Democrats and 2 more from the NPH (New Party Harbinger, not Neil Patrick Harris).  This is aptly called a 'winning coalition,' as opposed to the much less happily (but just as accurately) termed 'losing coalition' that other parties tried to form.  If the LDP had only formed a coalition with the Social Democrats (and excluded the NPH) it could have been referred to as a 'minimum winning coalition,' as the LDP had only formed the coalition with the smallest number of parties necessary to gain a majority in the Diet.

The Australian Green Party 2/14/12 revision

The Australian Green Party has seen significant growth recently. In the past election alone, they’ve increased their seats in Congress from 6 to 9. They now have the support of almost 12 percent of the population, and have now emerged as the third largest party in Australia. With Australia operating under a proportional election system for its Senate elections, this means something.

However, the Green Party’s success is not without its “growing pains.” In an effort to grow the party, the Greens have expanded their platform from its original stance on protecting the environment, to incorporating other issues of interest among the Australian electorate. In this effort to grow the party, a growing rift is forming from within. The leftist Greens remain staunch on the party’s original value of environmental protection, but the moderate Greens are moving toward the center, compromising on less than ideal policies to get something rather than nothing.

It can be thought that the rift that is forming in the Australian Green party is a result of being solicited by competing principles. John Carey talks about competing principles and how they can weaken party unity. Ideally, party leaders of the Green party would want its elected legislators to practice strong party cohesion. This could provide a foundation whereon the Green party could then expand on. However, the geographic of the Green party is playing a part in its division. Greens from the western side of Australia were previous members of the Greens Western Australia (WA). They tend to be more moderate in nature. The traditional Greens come from the eastern side of the country and are more liberal on the spectrum. Although these two groups have coalesced to form a single Green party, their differences may lead to their eventual division again. Their electorate slightly differ from one another, which means they are electing legislators based on slight differences in ideology. These legislators are then voting within the legislature outside of party lines, weakening party unity. This is not something that the Australian Green party can consider simple "growing pains."


-Kerr, Christian. "'Growing pains' divide the Greens, says Senator Lee Rhiannon." The Australian 02 Feb 2012, Web. 31 Mar. 2012. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/growing-pains-divide-the-greens-says-senator-rhiannon/story-fn59niix-1226269133812>.

The Woes of Intraparty Competition?

The ongoing republican presidential nomination race has brought about many interesting twist and turns. The fight to represent the party in a race against President Obama has pushed the candidates into a heated battle that has left some worried about the lack of cohesion from the republican base. The Republican National Committee (RNC) set up the candidate selection process this year so as to allow for more competition between candidates and prevent an easy victory for one single candidate[1]. Some say that this is poor planning and will cause candidates to tear down the eventual nominee, making him a weak challenger for President Obama, however, recent history has shown otherwise. Which brings into question whether or not intraparty competition helps or hurts parties in the end?

Primary elections are very different from those of a general election in many respects, one of which is that each candidate must run on a more individually accountable ticket, rather than being able to run collectively with a party. According to John Carey, electoral rules, as well as candidate selection, can decrease party unity. Each candidate is forced to differentiate himself from the rest of the crowd in order to win over the party base. The more intraparty competition there is, the greater the decrease of party cohesion[2]. This lack of cohesion has been quite evident through this recent nomination process. Mitt Romney has been teetering in and out of the front-runner spotlight, while candidates like Newt Gingrich, and more recently Rick Santorum have been battling their way to the top. This prolonged brawl has made candidates poke holes in each other’s reputations in an attempt to bring them down. This menial bickering, however, has caused them to attack principles that are generally promoted within the republican ideology. One of Mitt Romney’s conservative strengths has been his strong capitalist background, which is generally a respected republican value, but in this race he has been attacked for his business experience, saying that it has detached him from the general public. This and other attacks on conservativism have been made by each one of the candidates. Such attacks may bring candidates down, but they also start to pick apart and factionalize the party.

This type of competition, however, was seen in the 2008 Democratic Party nomination process. While John McCain was able to wrap up the Republican Nomination fairly quickly, the Democratic Nomination dragged on. This close race was defined by candidates taking harsh jabs at each other. In this race, Barrack Obama said that Hillary Clinton “parses and calculates and shifts for political position,” was “not seen as trustworthy by the American people,” and ranked as “one of the most secretive politicians in America today.”[3] Both Obama and Clinton won about 40 percent of the delegates during the nomination battle[4], which made many worried that the Democratic Party had split and would not be able to pull together for the general election. However, on November 2, the party banned together and came out with a commanding victory over the Republicans[5].

While this year’s nomination processes seems to be detrimental to the Republican Party, it could turn out to be just the opposite. Although intraparty competition can seem to factionalize a party, it can also help strengthen the party and its candidate, as well as prepare him to compete in the general election. If history is on the side of the republicans, they could have the momentum to beat the democrats in this year’s presidential election

---

[1] http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/this-is-how-romney-wins/

[2] Carey, J. (2009). Legislative voting and accountability. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

[3] http://www.deathandtaxesmag.com/163980/mitt-romney-hopes-obama-and-clintons-08-rivalry-can-help-in-2012/

[4] http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?f=0&year=2008&elect=1

[5] http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html

Syria’s in-efficient secret

Syria’s in-efficient secret:

            In his in depth analysis of the British Parliament between 1850 to 1870, political analyst Gary Cox discovered what he called the “efficiency secret” in governments.  Cox defines this secret as the “nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers.” Cox discovers that in the latter end of the 1800s, the British Parliament drastically increased power to the Cabinet.  Other government institutions gradually diminished their power and importance. 

            As a result, Britain’s Cabinet achieved more policy implementation than ever before.  Party discipline rose, MP policies driven by pork incentives decreased, and a party oriented electorate formed.  In essence, regional representation was replaced by a centralized power system.  This, therefore, allowed higher efficiency within the Cabinet.  Policies set forth by the majority party could be passed quicker than ever before.

            A dictatorship is the ultimate example of the “efficient secret.”  By nature of its position, a tyrant naturally has near-complete fusion of legislative and executive power.  In other words, what the dictator wants goes.  Interestingly enough, Syria’s dictatorship is an exception to this general rule.

            Syria is an exception because President (Syria is democratic in name only) Bashar al-Assad has continually stumbled with attempts at policy implementation.  One specific reason muddles the efficiency of Assad’s dictatorship: internal regime discord. 

A recent article from the International Crisis Group stated, “Many [government] decisions witness a contest between various lines of thought that coexist within the regime, each reflecting a slightly different worldview, diverging private interests or personal rivalries.” As Assad’s cabinet continues to bicker, their efficiency decreases.  Competing, powerful interests destroy Assad’s iron fist.  In essence, Assad deals with internal regime discord with many crucial decisions. 

ICG continues, “Further confusion arises from the fact that officials occasionally take initiatives or make pronouncements that are inconsistent with the authorized line – in an attempt to influence it; as a means of drawing attention to themselves; in order to express frustration; or, quite simply, out of ignorance.”

            Because of his in-efficient cabinet, President Assad will promise and not deliver.  This is the root cause of their current rebellion. 

On a side note, some believe that Syria’s in-efficiency is actually a calculated ploy to remain in power.  They believe Assad’s cabinet is perfectly able to pass policy through the necessary red tape.  Thus, the cabinet could be more calculated than they appear, by cunningly deciding to “stumble” in the system in order to avoid democratic policy implementation.

           

Whitaker, Brian. “When is a dictator not a dictator?” guardian.co.uk. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/18/dicator-syria-bah

Cox, The Efficient Secret. 1987. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Revised Post: Chandra more likely than Gershtenson

In my original post I referenced Gershtenson's article about individuals that political parties attempt to mobilize. Upon reviewing my original argument I realized that applying Gershtenson was not  completely accurate. Chandra's article about patronage democracies and voters compensating for unknowns by relying on ethnicity is a more suitable explanation for the ethnic outreach by presidential hopefuls in South Africa. 

In a move that seemed almost too strange to be true, presidential hopeful Jacob Zuma was seen many times in public donning his tribal Zulu clothing singing and dancing to Zulu songs. According to Chandra, Zuma was simply letting the Zulu's know that he is not ashamed to be a Zulu and that he would remember them when patronage opportunities arose. Could Helen Zille, the leader of the predominately white DA party, attempt a similar stunt and get similarly positive results?

According to a New York Times article, Mrs. Zille was in Shoshanguve singing and tentatively dancing to a song with Xhosa language lyrics. Spectator Simon Mahlangu was recorded as saying “She’s really not as bad as you’d expect”. 

The important thing to understand in these two cases is that neither politician was verbally promising legislation. Instead they were silently promising that they would remember and represent the ethnic group. The quote by Mr. Mahlangu is exactly the result Mrs. Zille wanted. It is almost as if he said, "Before I couldn't see beyond her whiteness, but now I can feel comfortable that she would represent Xhosa's well even though I don't know more about her now than I did before she sang". Mrs. Zille was filling in a deficiency she had according to Chandra. Xhosa voters could not rely on her race as a safe way of voting for her. However, by venturing into a township and singing traditional songs she broke down that barrier and let them know that she would represent their ethnicity and make available the desired public goods that politicians can give. 

Revised Post

Israel’s legislative body, the Knesset, has 120 members. Members are selected by proportional representation meaning that Knesset seats are divided by the percentage of the overall vote each party receives. As long as a party receives over two percent of the vote, that party is eligible for a Knesset seat.

Currently, the largest party in the Knesset is the Kadima party. Kadima has 28 seats in the Knesset. Despite its size, Kadima has almost no influence on policy. How is it that the largest party in Israel can have essentially no influence on the government?

Kadima does not have influence because it is not part of the governing coalition. Under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud party formed a governing coalition with five other parties. These five parties posses 74 seats in the Knesset. As a result, smaller parties are able to exert more policy influence than Kadima.

The Kadima party is holding a primary election on March 27^th. Three candidates are competing for the party leadership position. Avi Dichter is running for Kadima Party Chairman on the platform that if he is elected, then he will make every effort to join Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition. Dichter argues that it is extremely important to join Netanyahu’s coalition so that Kadima can have at least some impact on central issues. (http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=257490).

Tzipi Livni and Shaul Mofaz are the other candidates for the Kadima party chairman. Both of them have made it clear that they do not intend to compromise with Netanyahu. However, Livni and Mofaz still argue that Kadima needs to confront and beat Netanyahu’s coalition. Research shows that Kadima is likely to lose half of its seats in the Knesset. (http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/livni-sets-kadima-primary-for-late-march-as-party-rivals-ramp-up-rhetoric-1.408060 ).

It seems that ,Dichter may be the only one that can guarantee voters at least some influence. However, Dichter has little support and the primary is seen mostly as a contest between Livni and Mofaz. However, this puzzling scenario makes more sense if you consider the theory of Hinich and Munger in “Ideology, Candidate Strategy, and the Theory of Elections”. They claim that candidates need to do two things for voters:

1. 1.Provide promises of what they will do when they are elected.

2. 2.Provide proof that they are committed to their vision

Members of the Kadima party are unwilling to support Dichter because he is not complying with the second principle. Voters cannot be sure if Dichter is committed to the party’s vision. The other two candidates propose an ideological alternative to the current government. Dichter on the other hand, promises to blend Kadima’s liberal views with the right wing coalition. Voters are uncomfortable supporting someone with a weak ideological tie, because voters often worry that politicians will do whatever they want once elected. If candidate’s have a clear ideological tie, then voters are better able to predict what that candidate will do in office. Even when faced with unforeseeable circumstances, voters have a pretty good idea what a candidate with a clear ideology will do. Dichter is unlikely to win the primary election because voters see him as less predictable.

Belize Is A Cool Place

Belize has the queen on their money and Bob Marley in their hearts. Almost everyone rides cruiser bikes and have machetes to mow the lawn. Despite its avid use, marijuana is illegal. Some people like smoking near the LDS missionaries as they teach people outside because Cops will be less suspecting (I came to know the smell well). Voting day in Belize is very easy to recognize. Instead of an "I Voted" sticker (my greatest incentive to vote) everyone must dip their finger in a blue or red (depending on the party) paint that shows they've voted. This also prevents them from voting twice (I guess south of the equator paint doesn’t come off for 24 hours).

An interesting fact about Belize voting is their turnout rates. Belize voter turnout is around 80% for national elections. Pretty good for a country with no stoplights. So who gets out the vote? One party voter theory developed by researchers Karp and Banducci claims that voter activation by parties differs between new and old democratic states. Belize qualifies as the former so lets compare. According to Karp/Banducci parties in new democracies have less active campaigners, are less organized and funded, seek after a base to activate and target specific voters with influence and resources. By looking at its election history Belize seems to generally fit this theory.

1954 brought Belize’s first elections with an 80% turnout rate. This doesn’t fit the Karp/Banducci theory but could be explained by the fact that the winning party, the PUP, had already been around for 5 years building a base. The ’57 elections saw a 63% voter turnout. Right before this 10 members of the PUP committee resigned including the head representative of the Belize Worker’s Union. By losing this one member, the PUP lost access to all the union votes. This fits Karp/Banducci’s claim that new-democracy parties go after individual voters with influence and resources. The ’61 voter turnout of 80% further illustrates this as it was just after the formation of The Women’s United Group within the PUP. This new coalition gave women members of the PUP an urge to get out the female vote for their party causing a resurgence of voter turnout. Lastly in ’79 turnout was a whopping 89%. This is attributed to the newly created UDP party and its efforts to get voters to the polls. As far as we’re concerned the marijuana/machete country seems to follow suite.

Rockin' the conservative boat, in Utah

Recently, more than 40,000 Utahns signed an online petition against the new HB363.  The bill gave public schools the option of teaching sex education, and if they do teach it they can teach abstinence only.  It quickly and easily passed in both the Utah House and Senate.  However, once the bill reached Governor Gary Herbert’s desk, he simply felt that sex-education should stress the importance of abstinence but not interfere with parents’ decision to determine how their children are instructed.  He vetoed the bill, saying “I cannot sign a bill that deprives parents of their choice.”

This issue has been quite controversial in Utah, especially amongst Republicans.  Aside from many citizens, several politicians and prominent figures in Utah have been disappointed in the governor’s decision.  Some have even criticized the governor for claiming to be conservative, but not passing this “appropriate” bill of legislation, and even went as far as stating this may hurt his reelection.

This issue brings to light the Michigan model and revisionist model from an article by  Carsey and Layman.  They posed a question concerning issues that divide the party: do people change their opinion on the issue and stick with the party, or do they change parties to stick with their opinion on the issues?  Cognitive dissonance happens when new beliefs cause someone to battle within themselves on how they have already been believing.  In the Michigan model, one identifies with a party, then arranges their world in such a way to avoid cognitive dissonance.  In essence, you see things through the eyes of your party.  The revisionist model is where you revise yourself to another party when your party takes a stand on an issue you are not in accordance with.  If someone is aware of their party’s views and the issue, and that issue is salient to them, they will change parties and keep their views.  If the issue were not salient to them, they would change their position and not their party.  

In regards to the sex-education issue, people do not have the ability to change their party.  The democratic stance is one that would want the bill to be vetoed.  So, Republicans who did not get their way have nothing to do but be frustrated.  They cannot leave the party because this was a conservative bill in the first place.  Republicans on the other end, who wanted the bill vetoed, can happily stick with their party and hold to their views on the issue.  If the bill were not vetoed, then we might see some individuals shifting their views to stick with conservatism and others changing parties to keep their views and stance on the issue consistent. 


http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/53736564-78/bill-veto-governor-herbert.html.csp

Competing Principles Inside the Party

(I reviewed party unity in a previous blog post.  This post will explain the relationship between party unity and competing principals.)

Political parties increase group accountability when unified.  If a party is unified when voting, it is easy for voters to know how their representative (probably) voted.  Voters can learn how a party voted much more easily than they can learn how their individual representative voted.  Generalized information is distributed more quickly and more widely than specific information.  But if a political party is not unified, the group accountability of the party is diminished.  The voting habits of a particular representative can no longer be assumed to be mostly in line with the party.

John Carey claims that competing principals will decrease party unity.  In practice, this would mean that a member of a parliament might have a constituency that is more liberal than her party, may have been the beneficiary of an older politician's endorsement while running for an open seat, and may have been supported by a special interest group during that same election.  The party, the older politician, the special interest group, and the MP's own district might all want the candidate to vote in different ways.  As the number of competing principals grows, the politician finds herself increasingly motivated to vote in ways that do not align perfectly with her party.

In Japan (an in some other countries), factions exist within the party.  These factions would appear to be divisive; in the DPJ (currently in power), factions may be divided into two groups; factions that support Ozawa Ichiro, and factions that oppose him.  Ozawa Ichiro led the DPJ from 2006-2009.  The DPJ defeated the LDP (which had dominated Japanese politics from 1955-2009) the year Ozawa Ichiro stepped down.  Despite deep-seated differences between factions, the DPJ managed to prepare for and win the 2009 election.  How are Japan's factions, which are clearly principals competing against and within the party, not necessarily detrimental?


Factions in Japan are not ideologically based.  The factions are concerned with material gains; promotion, appointments, control over candidate nomination, etc.  While this does not mean that the factions in Japan do not influence their members' voting habits, factions do allow the parties in Japan to establish a united party vote (most of the time).  There have been several instances where factions have simply left a party (Ozawa Ichiro's faction and another faction left the LDP in 1993), and other instances when factions have voted against the rest of the party.  However, it seems that despite the existence of factions with their own exclusive membership lists, membership fees, offices, and staffs, some competing principals do not decrease party unity.  While party unity is important in achieving group accountability, and competing principals have the capacity to undermine party unity, the existence of competing principals does not make diminished party unity certain.

Allegience to....self?

A political party is used for many things. Of the most common is as a short cut to ideologies and decision making. We often don't want to research out all of the issues present (we're just lazy like that), but if we can find a political party that has many similar views on common issues, we might find comfort in aligning with a party as an easier way of accomplishing similar goals. In many ways, this is efficient. But what do you do when that party which you have aligned with suddenly makes a move that you don't agree with? Do you ignore it as an error that is but temporary, or would you choose to disavow your allegiance? Would you decide that your ideals are more correct? Or would you trust the party?

These are the questions that Political Scientists Thomas Carsey and Geoffrey Layman asked and a recent Swedish issue greatly highlights. Like America, Sweden is undergoing heated debates about the issue of immigration. Sweden is made up of 9 million people (less than New York City), and 1.4 million of those are immigrants. Most of the immigrants are Muslim. The populous is quite torn on the issue of allowing greater numbers of immigrants which would "keep up [their] welfare system], or refusing immigrants thus preventing some of the more radical to be admitted (Kellogg, 2011).

In simplest terms, the positions are divided by the two major parties. This is where the before-mentioned questions become interesting. In 1991, the Moderate party took control of Parliament, following a 60-year stint of the Social Democrats. Immigration had not become a major issue yet. By 1998, the Social Dems. had slipped further and further in the polls. It wasn't until 2002 that when the issues of Immigration and EU membership surfaced that the Social Dems had a sudden surge in popularity. The Moderates had taken up a position to import over 300k new immigrants, a costly process, and not at ALL popular. In this case, it was very clear that the Swedes would indeed choose their own individual ideals over their party's just as Carsey and Layman found.


Kellogg, Amy. 2011. Sweden's immigration debate. FoxNews.com. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/10/28/swedens-immigration-debate/ (accessed March 17, 2012).

Encyclopedia of the Nations. 2012. Sweden - Political Parties. http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Sweden-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html (accessed March 17, 2012).

Electorate Mobilization in Syria

                In a heated campaign run, political parties seek votes in a number of ways.  They first mobilize their cohesive base; those who will naturally vote their way no matter what.  After this base is secured, they seek “outside the box” voters.  These include:

1: Past voters

2: People who will mobilize others

3: married people

4: church goers

5: Past supporters of the party

6: Any other potential voters that are on the fence

There are a number of strategies parties take to influence these groups.  Many parties first buy credit card information to analyze political preferences.  Facebook and other social medias also maintain crucial information that suggests ideological leanings.  As parties obtain and analyze what we buy, sell, and view online, they know how to best approach us in their pitch. 

Each letter or email sent from a political party is quite calculated.  Although it may seem otherwise, thousands of dollars of research is spent on how to best persuade potential constituents.  Each television or internet advertisement is calculated to convince its main target audience.  A television advertisement in Utah or Arizona might be completely different in Florida or California.

 In July of 2011, Syria formally announced that parties other than the ruling Ba’ath party could compete on a national level.  The Sana news agency stated: "The government adopted a draft law regarding political parties in Syria as part of a programme of reform aimed at enriching the political life, creating a new dynamic and allowing for a change in political power.”

Eight months later, the Ba’ath party continues to control power in Syria.  How can this be?  Why couldn’t new parties gain different groups of constituents, as described above? 

One reason is because of the deep fear instilled by the ruling party.  A BBC news article stated, ”Human rights groups say that about 1,400 civilians and 350 security forces personnel have died in the four months of protest [previous to the allowance for new parties].”

Despite the statewide unrest and dissatisfaction, new parties continue to struggle to find new constituents in war torn Syria.  In my opinion, this is not because there are no new constituents to be found.  Rather, the Ba’ath party instills just enough fear into citizens that they do not align themselves with other parties.  The only way people will finally step out of this fear is if the rebels successfully defeat President Assad’s regime.  If this happens, thousands of currently hidden voices will come out in opposition to the Ba’ath party.  Hopefully, new parties will then be able to collect the all voters they deserve. 

Syria is to allow political parties, state agency says. 25 July. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14274891

South African Legislators: Unity through Cohesion or Discipline?

In his book “Legislative Voting and Accountability” John M. Carey seeks to understand whether legislatures are voting out of discipline or cohesion. Cohesions means that a party is voting together because they are united ideologically and want it to be that way. Discipline means that a party votes according to the rewards or punishments that follow their vote. Party unity means that a party is voting together whether it be a result of discipline or cohesion. This post will question whether South African politicians are voting out of cohesion or discipline. 

               Thiven Reddy wrote an article for Politikon, a South African political science journal, which explains that politicians are voting as a result of discipline and their fear of losing the favor of the powerful ANC party. Reddy explains that as a new proportional representation party list democracy South Africa should be a champion of the voice of the minority. However, with the ANC dominating every election since 1994 the list of voices to be heard has been unpredictably small. Reddy offers his thesis as to why this is, he says, “there is little questioning of the executive in parliamentary systems because members toe the party line. This is further enhanced in the part list PR electoral system of South Africa where party representatives fear the loss of their seats should the party bosses decide to remove them” (194). Furthermore, he claims “The party control of the state suffocates civil society, which reduces the democratic space, and blurs the line between the party and the state, which reduces accountability and increases corruption” (194). It is clear to see that with such a strong party the only principal that a politicians needs to oblige is the party in power.

               To answer the question posed in the thesis it seems that there can be little argument that South African politicians are voting out of discipline and as Reddy mentioned, fear of losing their seats and all the benefits that come with it.