Impeachment as a Electoral Tool: Trump, Republicans, and the 2018 Midterms

(Source: Time Magazine, 2017)

With Democrats poised to make significant gains in the upcoming midterms, Republicans have turned to an unusual strategy to rally support; talking about the impeachment of President Trump.

Out on campaigns, Republican candidates have been talking about what a Democrat-controlled Congress might mean for the future of America, chiefly, the impeachment of the President. While it is not clear how seriously Republican elites take this, talking about it has two important effects. First, trumpeting the impending impeachment of President Trump has made it easier for Republican candidates to secure donations, especially at the grassroots level. Second, Republican leaders are hoping that this once fear-mongering technique turned mainstream appeal will scare Republican voters into showing up in November. Former Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski remarked that “The threat of impeachment is something that unifies everybody in the party, even if you’re not a Trump supporter.”

Democrats have had mixed reactions to this development. Some on the far left have seized on the idea of impeachment, while Democrat party leadership has tried to keep quiet about the issue and, as the New York Times remarked, “focus on substantive issues.” In fact, party notables from both sides have expressed frustration with the emergence of impeachment as a polarizing and immaterial issue so early in the midterms. Former strategist for Newt Gingrich, Mike Shields, has said that “Republicans should leave that insanity to the left,” while former strategist for Barack Obama, David Axelrod, has cautioned that “if impeachment becomes a political tool instead of the end result of a credible investigation, then you are as guilty as Trump, in some ways, of taking a hammer blow to institutions.”

It seems unusual that Republicans are using a tool like the threat of impeachment to mobilize voters. Those who study elections tell us that political parties usually don’t use external threats to mobilize support. Rather, parties generally go after those who already predisposed to vote, will support their own party, and who have more social and economic resources. Parties also only really care about voter mobilization in politically contested areas (i.e. swing states). As methods of data collection and interpretation improve, parties have also moved towards using variables such as an individual’s income, age, civic involvement, social network, and even their consumer habits to predict ideology and reach out to potential voters.

And while the threat of impeachment for President Trump is arguably present, it is not imminent. In January, when a vote was held in the House to begin the impeachment process, only 66 Democrats voted in favor, not even close to half of the caucus. Public polling has found that a plurality, not a majority, of voters favor Trump’s impeachment.  With this in mind, it is rather confusing as to why Republican elites would adapt a previously fringe message to use as a common mobilizer in the upcoming elections.

One possible explanation is the regular disparities that have arisen between Republican legislators and President Trump. Trump’s views are sometimes not shared by those in his party, and these disparities have made it difficult for Republican midterm candidates. The administration’s escalating trade conflict with China is a recent example. Farmers, who are generally a part of the Republican voter base, have not been happy with Trump’s tariffs and the resulting trade conflicts, as China has specifically targeted Trump voters using tit for tat economic sanctions. Republican midterm candidates are worried that these unhappy constituents will not yield favorable electoral outcomes and have asked the administration to consider a more strategic approach.

Another possible explanation takes into consideration the currently fragmented nature of the Republican electorate. A recent slew of scandals from the Trump administration has potentially alienated Republican voters. To combat this fragmentation, it’s possible Republican leaders are using fear of Trump’s impeachment to solidify the Republican base, and to frame the upcoming midterm elections in a more stable us-versus-them way. Whatever the reason for this unusual strategy, time will tell whether it is effective.

Expropriation without Compensation!

South Africa is in a state of turmoil as they adjust to their new presidency. In February of this year, the old president Jacob Zuma left office, and is currently facing criminal charges for fraud. South Africa’s newest president, Cyril Ramaphosawas elected this year from the ruling party, the African National Congress. (ANC). As Zuma’s replacement, he ran on the policies and promises that the African people of South Africa would once again regain control of their native lands. What does this mean exactly?

On February 27, 2018, a vote was held in parliament to recover and seize all lands from white farmers in South Africa. A Marxist opposition leader, Julius Malemaproposed the notion to the parliament, hoping that the new president would act. The notion passed in parliament, with a vote of 241 to 83. Mr. Malema was quoted to say, “Reconciliation is over.” He along with the black South African majority in parliament are seeking repercussions for the decades of apartheid in the nations recent past. “We must ensure that we restore the dignity of our people without compensating the criminals who stole our land.”

Census reports have noted that nearly 72% of all farm land is owned by white South Africans, and has been slowly declining since the end of the Apartheid. Many are worried that taking the land away from citizens of any race without compensation will cause unforeseeable consequences in the future. Not to fare ago in the past, the Zimbabwe government enacted a similar policy in their nation. To this day, they are seeing the economic and humanitarian effects of that decision. This is a direct violation of the nation’s current standing constitution, where it was amended nearly two decades prior to protect the land of white owners. This was done with the knowledge that whites are a minority in the country and that their property was to be protected at the end of the Apartheid. The Constitution is now undergoing the amendment process to strip white South African of their land without compensations.

Not even into the third month of the new year and already the nation has seen the murder of fifteen white farmers, and over one hundred and nine attacks. Every five days one white south African is killed over the color of his skin and the land he owns. Julius Malema was quoted to say in 2016, that he is “not calling for the slaughter of white people - at least for now”. Thousands of people are worried for their safety in a nation that clearly does not care for their basic human right to life.

Peterson’s motivated reasoning and political parties say that voters are reliant on the social ques of their party’s leaders to help them make political decisions. The research shows that even when parties cross the line into unfamiliar territory about a new policy issues, that the voters will usually follow their lead. We can see this happening in South Africa, the Politian’s are voicing an opinion that they say the masses are wanting communicated. Despite their harsh past both blacks and whites in South Africa have learned how to live peacefully for nearly two decades. Maybe, the violence towards white land owners is really occurring from a small minority of individuals and the president’s agenda. They could be too afraid to admit that the minority Marxist party members are controlling the outcome, over fear of losing their heritage and dignity if they do not go along with what the masses seem to want. No matter the cause, this endemic humanitarian crisis is affecting the lives and international relations of South Africa. What will happen to theses land owners? Some have begun petitions to get them visas to come to the United States, although that is a whole other problematic topic. 

References

Mailonline, Ben Hill For. “'We Are Not Calling for the Slaughter of White People - at Least for Now': South African Parliament Votes to SEIZE White-Owned Land as Experts Warn of Violent Repercussions.” Daily Mail Online, Associated Newspapers, 28 Feb. 2018, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5443599/White-South-African-farmers-removed-land.html.

Cole, Brendan. “A White Farmer Is Killed Every Five Days in South Africa and Authorities Do Nothing about It, Activists Say.” Newsweek, Newsweek, 19 Mar. 2018, www.newsweek.com/white-farmer-killed-every-five-days-south-africa-authorities-do-nothing-851470.

An Odd Couple: Solutions in German Coalition Formation

Germany’s colorful political history assures that the ideologies of its various political parties are no less varied. While apparent in campaigns and party manifestos, the salience of these cleavages becomes most apparent when it comes time to form coalitions. After more than four months of coalitions negotiations following the 2016 federal elections, the German party heads finally reach an agreement to form a grand coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU. Research on the intricacies of coalition formation both before and after elections coupled with a knowledge of Germany’s political landscape can lend to understanding of the challenges German politicians faced forming a government in the wake of a political shakeup.

The following is an introduction to German political parties to set the stage:  

The Left Party

Born from the ashes of the East German socialist party after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Die Linke exhibits ideology that is both fiscally and socially highly liberal.

The Green Party

A champion of environmental and social awareness and sustainability, the party entered the German political sphere as a result of a merger between the East and West German Green parties after reunification in 1990.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP)

The pro-business Free Democratic Party has long been a proponent of market liberalism and civil liberties and is often a coalition partner with the far-larger CDU/CSU.

Alternative for Germany (AfD)

The nationalist right-wing party was developed by a group of Germany professors skeptical of EU influence in the German economy. The party has since become known for its harsh stance on immigration.

The Socialist Democratic Party (SPD)

Established as a Marxist party in the late nineteenth century and then again as a socialist party after World War II, the SPD represents the interests of workers and unions.

The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)

The CDU, and her Bavarian sister party the CSU, together form the German conservative party alliance that promotes a fiscally conservative agenda and often more traditional social policy.

In the 2016 federal elections, the CDU/CSU suffered considerable losses caused by voter defection to the AfD and the FDP while the SPD experienced losses to smaller left-wing parties; The Left and the Greens. Although the CDU/CSU still won a plurality of the votes, achieving its lowest election result since 1949 gave it significantly less power at the start of coalition negotiations.

CDU/CSU party heads declared they would begin coalition negotiations with the intention of forming a “Jamaica Coalition,” with the FDP and Green parties (a nod to the black-green-yellow Jamaican flag). As months dragged on and no deal had been reached, rumors started to circulate that a grand coalition between the SPD and CDU/CSU was in the works. On February 7, 2018, Angela Merkel announced a coalition government between the CDU/CSU and their direct opponent, the SPD. This announcements was surprising considering the SPD had announced it would, under no circumstances, enter a coalition with the CDU/CSU. So what happened? Scholarly research regarding how German government institutions such as bicameralism and the investiture vote affect which parties form can and will form coalitions after elections.

Merkel stand beside coalition partners Horst Seehofer (CSU) and Sigmar Gabriel (SPD)

Political scholars Sven-Oliver Proksch and Jonathan B. Slapin’s analysis of the importance of investiture votes and unicameralism yield interesting insight into the affects both institutions have on the formation of coalitions. First, minority governments are unlikely to form in Germany, because the investiture vote requires the potential ruling coalitions to receive a vote of support from the majority of parliament. If a minority government tries for the vote and doesn’t succeed, it cannot rule. Second, the CDU/CSU controls higher chamber of parliament which votes on the majority of legislation passed by the lower chamber, the Bundestag. This disincentivizes left-leaning parties from attempting to form governments and nearly ensures that the governing coalition will in some way have to include the CDU/CSU.

Given these constraints, many potential coalitions were ruled out because the barriers imposed are just to great. Here is why two of the most like coalitions did not succeed:

CDU/CSU - FDP

This coalition between two pro-business parties that have limited social policy differences seems to be one of the most likely. A CDU/CSU-FDP government would have little problem passing policy through the Bundesrat, but would likely never get there as it would be a minority government and would likely be kept away from ruling by a lack of support for an investiture vote.

SPD - Left - Green

A coalition of Germany’s left parties would also be unlikely to get past an investiture vote. And even if it did, a large portion of its legislation would never make it past the Bundesrat. Together, these two institutional barriers prevented the success of a coalition from the left.

A final potential solution could have overcome the institutional barriers to coalition formation but encountered a problem that political scientists find much more difficult to study. Throughout the course of coalition negotiations, no party made any attempt to form a government with the AfD. The AfD and CDU/CSU were ideologically closer than most other coalition configurations, but the AfD was never a part of coalition negotiation. This is likely because the incendiary and controversial nature of the AfD’s stance on policies made the AfD an “untouchable” coalition partner. Parties feared that allying with the AfD would follow them into the next election cycle and serve as fodder against their candidates.

Photo Credit Table: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017-latest-results-live-merkel-bundestag-afd

Photo Credit Party Leaders: https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/904040/Emmanuel-Macron-Angela-Merkel-new-alliance-Austria-Sebastian-Kurz

Coalition Building in Brazil

          In democratic systems like Brazil, where seats in the lower house of the national legislature are allocated proportionally, there are usually many political parties elected to govern. Because of this, none of them attains a majority in the legislature necessary to pass laws and form a cohesive government. In these systems, parties and interest groups generally band together to form coalitions. Two or three parties or groups usually ally together to form a bloc. These parties agree to vote support one another’s legislative priorities and vote for each other’s bills after unifying around a similar ideology or policy agenda. Golder gives a thorough analysis of the importance and influence of coalitions in the German political system by examining the possible coalitions that could have formed after the 2005 German elections in her article.

            Golder argues that the German electoral system makes it difficult for small parties to form coalitions against the largest parties and therefore led to the grand coalition between the CDU and SPD in 2005. In a similar manner, the Brazilian electoral system influences which coalitions form. For example, one of Brazil's most serious institutional challenges is "coalitional presidentialism", a system in which the president must form and govern over a multiparty coalition, which becomes more difficult the more parties are involved. There are more than eight political parties in the Brazilian legislature with more than 5 percent of the seats. Because of this, Brazil’s electoral system requires the president to do a lot of political bargaining in order to maintain a coalition.

Through the late 1990s and early 2000s, democracies in Latin America experienced a strong move to the left as socialist governments came to power. These governments nationalized industries, increased social spending, provided large benefits to workers, and implemented radical political agendas. This rise of the left was given the name of the “pink tide”. However, large-scale corruption scandals and economic decline greatly discredited these leftist governments. As the strength of these leftist parties has waned, conservative Brazilian parties have become more popular.

Brazil is one country that has experienced a shift to the right after the ebb of the pink tide. Since the 2014 elections, Brazil has been governed by the so-called “Bible, beef, and bullets” lobby. This coalition is made up of evangelical Christian politicians and interest groups, the farm lobby and conservative lawmakers determined to ease strict firearms controls. The farm lobby, backed by the booming agribusiness sector, won 42 percent of the seats in Brazil’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, and one quarter of the seats in the Senate. Evangelical Christian lawmakers won a further 76 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, greatly due to financial assistance from Brazil’s fast-growing Pentecostal churches. The ideological alliance between the evangelicals, farmers, and gun lobby is made up of lawmakers from many different political parties. However, these lawmakers chose to ally with one another to form a coalition because they vote similarly on social and economic issues. These groups consistently opposed the advance of gay rights and reproductive rights for women. They united together with a common goal to pass conservative legislation. Now they want to restrict gay rights and abortion, lower the age of criminal responsibility and advance farmers’ interests in conflicts with Indian tribes.

These three groups agreed to support Michel Temer’s presidency in exchange for the executive branch’s support in achieving these policy goals despite his possible implication in the Petrobras corruption scandal that brought about the impeachment of his predecessor, Dilma Rousseff. It seems that the coalitions efforts to achieve these policy objectives are succeeding. Bills to relax Brazil’s strict gun laws, reduce the age of criminal responsibility to 16 years old, and ban abortion even in cases of rape are passing in Brazil’s lower house. Furthermore, a bill to undo key parts of Brazil’s 2003 Disarmament Law, which was praised as a key step toward containing crime and robbery in cities was passed in committee last year.

A spokesman for President Temer’s government said that his cabinet voiced its support for most of the Bible, beef, and bullet’s lobby’s agenda. In a further move to consolidate his support among members of this coalition, President Temer appointed Blairo Maggi as Minister of Agriculture. Maggi is the owner of the Brazilian company Ammagi Group, the world’s largest soybean producer.

Although the Bible, beef, and bullets coalition in currently ruling Brazil, President Temer faces the difficult prospect of keeping the coalition together. Some members of the coalition are beginning to oppose his presidency because of the strong evidence that he was involved in the Petrobras scandal. Some also argue that his efforts to bring about economic reform and end the current crisis is not working. Temer barely survived a vote in the lower house to put him on trial for corruption charges.

In conclusion, the large number of parties in the Brazilian political system causes the Brazilian president to have difficulty controlling the governing coalitions. The decreasing popularity of the leftist parties in Latin America has also caused conservative parties to rise and allowed for the formation of the Bible, beef, and bullets lobby. Only time will tell if President Temer can maintain this coalition and keep his party in control of the presidency.

Weakness of Brazilian Political Parties Causes Corruption

In many democratic systems, political parties are mainly viewed as a means by which candidates obtain power. In fact, the average voter seems to feel some level of distrust towards political parties. Though it may be true that the main purpose of political parties is to get candidates into office, political parties actually serve many different functions in various democratic systems. Without them, democracy is undermined and democratic institutions are jeopardized. This phenomenon is clearly displayed in the current political crisis in Brazil.

Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Maxwell Cameron illustrate the importance of parties in their analysis of regime change in Peru. They argue that parties are critical to ensure a well-functioning democracy for various reasons. Three of their arguments are crucial to understanding democratic weakness in Brazil. First, parties provide voters with crucial information about candidates in the election process. Without political parties, voters have difficulty differentiating between a myriad of candidates vying for their support. Second, political parties make politicians less self-centered and shortsighted. In systems where party organizations are weak, politicians often sell their vote to the highest bidder in exchange for financial benefits. Third, parties provide a vehicle whereby voters can hold politicians accountable. These three weaknesses exacerbated Peru’s institutional crisis and led to the rise of Fujimori and the military dictatorship. These same three principles can also be applied in the context of the current democratic dilemma in Brazil.

Brazil currently has 35 political parties, 25 of which have representatives in the national legislature. Of these 25 parties, Brazil is actually governed by a coalition of the five dominant parties; the Workers’ Party (PT),  the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the Democrats (DEM), and the Progressive Party (PP). However, these parties are structurally feeble, are unresponsive to voters, and have inefficient governance structures.

These weaknesses have contributed to the Brazil’s current predicament. Former PT President Dilma Rousseff was impeached after being found guilty of misconduct and being complicit in the regarding Petrobras, which has been called the “largest corruption scandal in Brazilian history.” Since Rousseff’s impeachment, scores of other politicians have been removed from office and jailed. In essence, an entire generation of Brazilian politicians have been discredited. Rousseff’s vice president, Michel Temer, a member of PMDB, has held the presidency since her departure. However, he and many of his allies have also been linked to the Petrobras scandal. Brazilian markets have suffered, voters are disenfranchised and disillusioned, and extremist candidates are gaining steam in the run-up to the 2018 presidential election. It is easy to draw similarities between Brazil’s current political situation and the difficulties faced by Peru in the 1980s. Both countries are plagued by the same underlying problem; weak political parties that are unable to provide the three important functions mentioned above.

fiscal pedaling scandal

First, Brazilian parties are unable to provide voters with information about candidates. This problem is partly due to the enormous size of Brazil’s electoral districts. Brazil is divided into 27 states which serve as electoral districts. Although it initially makes sense that districts should be divided by state lines, the Brazil’s is unique. Brazil’s largest district, Amazonas, is more than twice the size of Texas. São Paulo the most populous state in Brazil, is home to more than 44 million people. With such large and populous districts, it is extremely difficult for Brazilian parties to widely disseminate accurate information about their candidates. During one election in São Paulo, more than 20 percent of the electorate abstained or made a mistake on their ballots. Parties’ inability to provide information about candidates has allowed corrupt politicians to gain office because voters know little about them before election day.

            Second, Brazil’s weak parties fuel politicians’ self-interest and greed. In order to attract voters in such large electoral districts, politicians need money. However, Brazil’s weak political parties are unable to provide the funds that politicians need to buy votes. Brazilian companies are happy to donate to politicians in place of parties, but they expect to receive government contracts once a politician is in office. This relationship between politicians and businessmen was the root cause of the Petrobras scandal. If political parties had a stronger and more established donation network, politicians could rely on parties rather than corrupt financial interests for donations and avoid corruption scandals. 

        

    Finally, party weakness in Brazil inhibits voters from holding politicians accountable. In a parliamentary system like Brazil where voters cast their votes for a party rather than a candidate, weak party structures allow politicians to frequently change their affiliation, jumping from one ship to another. Although Brazilian voters can choose to not vote for a party that they believe has performed unsatisfactorily, the politicians who switch to another party are not held accountable for their performance in elections. Furthermore, unlike most proportional representation systems, party leaders in Brazil do not decide who wins the seats that the party is allocated. Brazil is an open list rather than a closed list electoral system. While seats are awarded in proportion to the votes that each party wins, the candidates who win seats are those who receive the most votes within each party. This characteristic of Brazil’s electoral system weakens party organizations by taking away their ability to choose who gets to fill the seats that they win.

            In conclusion, Brazil’s volatile political climate has been caused because political parties do not have the sufficient strength to cultivate strong democratic institutions in Brazil. If parties were strengthened enough to perform these three essential functions, the future of Brazilian politics would be much brighter.