Syria's in-eficiency secret

Syria’s in-efficient secret:

            In his in depth analysis of the British Parliament between 1850 to 1870, political analyst Gary Cox discovered what he called the “efficiency secret” in governments.  Cox defines this secret as the “nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers.” Cox discovers that in the latter end of the 1800s, the British Parliament drastically increased power to the Cabinet.  Other government institutions gradually diminished their power and importance.  Even backbenchers saw their influence greatly weaken. 

            As a result, Britain’s Cabinet achieved more policy implementation than ever before.  Party discipline rose, MP policies driven by pork incentives decreased, and a party oriented electorate formed.  In essence, regional representation was replaced by a centralized power system.  This, therefore, allowed higher “efficiency” within the Cabinet.  Policies set forth by the majority party could be passed quicker than ever before.

            In theory, a dictatorship should naturally have a built in “efficiency secret”; for better or for worse.  What the dictator wants immediately is implemented.  What is strange, therefore, is Syria’s lack of ability to achieve the efficiency secret’s competence. Perhaps this is the reason why civil war broke out.

            In his twelve year reign as President (Syria is democratic in name only), Bashar al-Assad continually stumbled with attempts at policy implementation.  A recent article from the International Crisis Group stated,

“Many decisions witness a contest between various lines of thought that

coexist within the regime, each reflecting a slightly different worldview,

diverging private interests or personal rivalries. Some decisions ultimately

reflect a balance between diverse institutional power centres; others, a more

decisive victory by a particular one ... Further confusion arises from the fact

that officials occasionally take initiatives or make pronouncements that are

inconsistent with the authorised line – in an attempt to influence it; as a

means of drawing attention to themselves; in order to express frustration;

or, quite simply, out of ignorance.”

            International relations with western states suffer as a result of this.  President Assad will promises one thing, but will not (or cannot) deliver on his promises the next day.  The real question is whether this “inefficient secret” is either a calculated ploy to remain in power, or a true lack of control over the Syrian government.  Perhaps the inefficiency of Assad‘s quest for democracy is a well-calculated maneuver to stay in power.   Yet at the same time, he could not successfully destroy a rising rebellion.  President Assad has quite efficiently killed thousands of Syrian protestors and political enemies over the years, yet stumbles to reform important democratic policies. 

            In effect, President Assad is either a cunning genius or blundering fool.  The outcome of the civil war will decide how Syrian history books paint this picture.

Whitaker, Brian. “When is a dictator not a dictator?” guardian.co.uk. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/18/dicator-syria-bah

Cox, The Efficient Secret. 1987. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press