Recently, the New York Times reported on how
Senator Rand Paul is pursuing a different strategy than many competitors as he
prepares for a possible Presidential election run. The article discusses in
detail how Mr. Paul is courting technology entrepreneurs at a festival in
Austin, Texas. Austin itself is known as a bastion of liberal strength in the
center of a conservative state. The attendees of the conference are expected to
be people who usually vote with the Democratic Party. While most of Mr. Paul’s
competitors are out speaking in New Hampshire, a state that has great
importance for the Republican primary because it is traditionally first to hold
its primary election, Mr. Paul is courting a different kind of voter in the
hopes to build a new type of strategy for a Presidential bid, one that could
shift the boundaries of the Republican party and what it means to vote
Republican. In fact, Mr. Paul is so committed to this strategy that he has
opened an office for his political-action committee in the center of downtown
Austin.
But what are the causes behind why a
candidate might target certain groups of people in their campaign, while
leaving other groups untouched? Political theory can help us understand this in
general, as well as helping us understand Mr. Paul’s own un-orthodox campaign
decisions. In “Mobilization Strategies of Democrats and Republicans” Professor
Joseph Gershtenson explains and tests the many factors that affect whether a
party decides to contact a voter or not. In explaining why parties choose to
contact certain individuals over others, Gershtenson postulates four main
considerations that he believes guide the party in its decision of who to
contact. First, parties contact those who are already predisposed to
participate (have participated in the past). Second, parties should avoid
contacting those who support their opponents as this will cause them to
mobilize and vote for their opponent. Third, parties should be more inclined to
contact individuals who have social connections as they will achieve a greater
effect by doing this. And finally, parties will contact people more in areas
that have contested elections. Using statistical tests, he finds that factors
that predict whether a party will contact someone include their partisan
attachment, whether or not they voted in the previous election, and their
income, education, and age among other factors. These findings confirm the four
hypotheses that Gershtenson postulated.
So how does this fit in with the
behavior of potential Presidential candidates, and particularly the seemingly strange
behavior of Senator Rand Paul? Although Mr. Paul is not a political party, he
is likely to exhibit the same strategic behavior when contacting because his
goal, like that of the party, is to win the election. His decision to attend a
tech conference in Austin, Texas can largely be explained by the third
consideration that Gershtenson hypothesizes. Namely, he is contacting and
courting individuals who have powerful social connections. Mr. Paul aims to
build the most connected, tech-savvy campaign in history and the tech industry
as a whole is vital to his success in this area, both for the primary election
and the following general election. By attempting to gain favor with this group
early on, Mr. Paul is building a network of people that have a new kind of
social connection that Gerhtenson did not anticipate in his study in 2003. Mr.
Paul is betting that if he can gain the young, tech-savvy Democrat leaning
audience of Austin, Texas, it will make waves with voters across the country
because of the social media capacity that they can bring to his team.
At the same time, Gershtenson’s
theory does not fit perfectly with Mr. Paul’s behavior. Mr. Paul is attempting
to convert a Democrat leaning audience into votes for himself. Gershtenson
predicts in his research that such an activity is too costly and is often
likely to simply motivate the voters to vote for an opponent in the election.
Seeing the results of the coming primary election, and perhaps the general
election, will be an interesting test of whether Gershtenson’s predictions
hold, or whether Mr. Paul’s gamble will pay off.
Sources
and Further Reading:
Mobilization
Strategies of the Democrats and Republicans, 1956-2000
Joseph
Gershtenson
Political
Research Quarterly
Vol.
56, No. 3 (Sep., 2003) , pp. 293-308
Published
by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3219790
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