| Departments of France |
Around
the world many countries have been taking measures in recent years to attempt
to alleviate inequalities in representation in democracies. Various measures,
such as mandatory representation for minorities or requiring the same number of
men and women on ballots, have been undertaken in the effort to provide fair
representation for minorities and historically disadvantaged groups. However,
these efforts do not always have the intended results. A recent election in
France for French Departmental Council positions demonstrates the challenges of
electoral reform and representation. In these elections, a new French law
mandates that pairs consisting of a man and a women must be elected to each
departmental council. This must result in 2054 men and 2054 women being seated
in the councils. Although this was carried out successfully, the leadership of
the departments still had the most powerful position, that of the President of
the Department, taken mostly by men. France 24 news declares, “In 101
departments, the ratio of men to women (Presidents) is 91-10. Far, very far
from the absolute parity imposed in the departmental councils by the election
of a binomial masculine-feminine pair.” Why have these reforms been instituted?
And why do they, as in this case, often seem to fall short of the ideals that
they embody? Political science allows us to postulate likely answers to these
questions.
Dr. Murray, Dr. Krook, and Dr.
Opello (hereafter Krook et al.) wrote an article about gender quotas specific
to France in 2012. Although the article predates the recent outcome of the
French Departmental elections, the analysis provided gives us a framework in
which we can better understand recent events. In their article Krook et al.
examine possible reasons why male dominated parties would adopt quotas that
require females to be elected because the quotas inherently go against the
self-interest of males who might be replaced by females. They argue that party
pragmatism shows that quota adoption is consistent with incentives that
legislators and party leaders face and that it fits into an explanation of
ideological, electoral and strategic incentives. Krook et al. explain that parties
on the left were motivated to support electoral reforms because of ideological
and electoral factors. It would be inconsistent with their ideology to oppose
quotas, and it would also go against the views of the majority of their voters.
Parties on the right on the other hand were coerced into supporting quotas by
public opinion and pressure from their leaders. However, both parties on the
right and the left could safely pursue policies that called for quotas while
remaining confident that most of their legislators could remain male because of
strategic placing of candidates. Although the parties are required to have a
certain percentage of female candidates, Krook et al. found that female
candidates are consistently placed into races where they are expected to lose,
not because of their gender but because the seat is a safe seat for the
opposing party. In this way, parties can easily fulfill the law and appease
voters while maintaining the status quo.
Krook et al.’s analysis helps to
interpret the recent events in the French Departmental elections because these
elections follow a similar trend. French Departmental Councils are not
particularly powerful positions. They administer social and welfare allowances,
junior high school buildings and staff, local roads, and some municipal infrastructure.
This is important to note because although French leadership voted to have
perfect parity in the councils, they did so for a lower level office and
without the consent of those already serving in that office. As explained by
Krook et al. it was in their interest to do so because of the political gains
that come from following the public will of equality and staying true to one’s
ideological commitments. However, strategically the politicians who imposed the
quota did not fear any loss of power. Furthermore, the most important position
in the departments, that of President, is still mostly filled by men. In the
same way that women who run in elections for the national legislature are
marginalized because of their placement in tough districts, here it appears
that women are once again being marginalized in some way that prevents them from
competing as effectively for these Presidential positions. Although Krook et
al.’s research cannot provide us with the method that helped men to largely
defeat women in these races, their work provides compelling evidence that
although parties and legislators controlled by men are happy to support
equality in principle, they have and continue to develop ways to ensure their
power is secure in practice.
Sources
and Further Reading:
No comments:
Post a Comment