Based on what I've just summarized, it seems difficult for a politician to hop parties. For example, a neo-conservative would have a hard time jumping into the Democratic Party. And then telling Debbie Wasserman Schultz to go find a new job, because he just took hers. But that is more or less what Ozawa Ichiro did. He left the LDP in the early 90s and became the head of the (opposition party) DPJ 13 years later. Nor was Ozawa the only politician to defect from the LDP and emerge in another party.
(Imagine Sarah Palin running as a Democrat.)
There are some ways in which Japanese politicians do follow Hinich and Munger's theories. Compromise is still difficult. The Japanese Constitution has never been amended, although several politicians (including Ozawa) have submitted amendments so that the Constitution explicitly allows for a military force. Japanese politicians are split because of differences in opinion; should Japan continue to rely on American military force? or should Japan take increased responsibility and become liable to assist America in potential future military conflict?
Such issues divide Japanese politics and Japanese political parties in particular. One of the reasons why some of Hinich and Munger's theories do not appear to apply to Japan on the surface is that Japan's parties are highly factionalized. Within the LDP are three major factions, one of which favors continued dependence on American military force and opposes rewarding white collar workers' overtime pay, while another favors domestic defense industry and the other supports white collar workers. Naturally, the ideology within the party as a whole is not as well-defined as it is in a political party in America.
Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. 1994. Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Krauss, Ellis S. and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2010. The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP: political party organizations as historical institutions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.






