The Switch

Blog Post #2 - Carson Robb

 

Background: Utah Governor’s Race 2020

In a state where registered Republicans outnumber registered Democrats 3 to 1, it’s safe to say that the state’s Republican Primary can be more telling than the general election in November. In an interview held just weeks before the June primary, Jim Dabakis surprised many when he announced that he would be registering as a Republican to be able to vote in the Republican closed-primary. This surprise came to many since Dabakis served three years as the Democratic Party Chair for the State of Utah, was the only openly-gay member of the Utah State Legislature, and was even a past candidate for Salt Lake City’s liberal Mayoral seat. This switch wasn’t just for Dabakis, however. Just six days before the June 30^thelection, it was reported that nearly 73,000 Utahns had registered Republican to be able to vote in the Primary. It also become apparent that of this number, nearly 7,800 active Democrats had switched their affiliation along with about 21,000 unaffiliated voters. Contributing to this switch comes (for some) not just as a result of the Utah governor’s race in 2020, however.  Some Democrats throughout Utah feel that their voice has been consistently ignored by the Utah Republican Party and it’s control on the legislature. For example, it was reported in 2018 that Utah Democrats received a third of the votes throughout the State, but only held a fifth of the seats in the State Legislature. Additionally, a ballot proposition which had passed with large margins (Prop 4) was altered by lawmakers after discussions broke down due to  the Republican leadership’s declining decision to agree to ban partisan and incumbent gerrymandering during the redistricting process. Thus, for some that switched party ballots to vote this last June, it was a way to have their voices finally heard. 

 

Concept: Party as a Form of Mobilization Efforts 

In our reading titled Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass authors Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague seek to answer three questions towards the beginning of their study: Whom do each of the parties contact? What criteria do the parties use in deciding whom to contact? In this respect are the parties ignorant, or merely naive? To answer these (and other) questions, Huckfeldt/Sprague examine South Bend, Indiana. At one point they state, “The dominance of the Democratic party in [South Bend] creates a situation in which the winner of the Democratic primary is frequently the winner of the general election as well, and thus the stakes are often higher in the Democratic primary.” Additionally, they relate that, “Many Republican loyalists vote in Democratic primaries, but Democratic loyalists seldom vote in Republican primaries… It becomes difficult, especially for the Democrats, to identify their supporters. Thus, the majority party is placed at an institutional disadvantage.” Note that the point of these statements being: that parties can be somewhat inhibited to mobilize voters when a large number switch parties prior to a closed-primary election. 

 

Synthesis: So What? 

The concept above regards party mobilization efforts. From the Huckfeldt and Sprague reading, we could come to properly assume some of the roles that the Utah Republican Party may end up taking to mobilize the vote in November. Instead of basing mobilization efforts strictly on primary preference (as the Utah Democrats would find to be more successful), they might use zone residences to gauge political sympathies. Again, this would be due to the fact that more Democrats would switch to vote for a Republican than a Republican would switch to vote for a Democrat thanks to party dominance within the State. Because of this concept (noted in the previous paragraph) we might expect the Utah Republican Party to use three methods in mobilizing by zones. First, they might mobilize in areas where turnout in the Republican primary was the highest. This would (possibly) give mobilization efforts a higher chance of being successful. Second, the party could determine neighborhoods to visit based off of high social status, since this could yield more sympathetic Republicans. Lastly, the Utah Republican Party might select to go to a neighborhood or zone depending on its history for expressing Republican sympathies. All of these actions that the Utah Republican Party might use to mobilize the vote in November can best be understood in context of the large primary party switch by unaffiliated or Democratic voters in June.